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Abstract 
 
Regulatory change in the USA (Regulation FD, 2000) establishes new requirements for full and fair disclosure by 
public companies.  By contrast, Australia has operated continuous disclosure like that introduced in Regulation FD 
since 1996.  Firms are required by law immediately to disclosure information that has a material effect on the firm’s 
operating conditions. Refinement of these requirements took place in September 1999 when the Australian Stock 
Exchange established an “open briefing” to provide greater disclosure to the market on the reasons for the material 
changes announced by listed firms.  This paper examines the first year of the new open briefing process. We find that 
open briefing firms are larger, have greater growth opportunities and higher debt than other firms. Abnormal trading 
volume and volatility is significantly highly during open briefings indicating they have information content although 
abnormal share prices are not significantly different from zero.  Firm size and interest coverage are positively associated 
with the cross-sectional variation in abnormal return to the open briefing firm at the day of the open briefing. 
 
Acknowledgements: I would like to acknowledge comments from Tim Brailsford, Richard Heaney, Barry Oliver, and 
participants at the 13th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference December 2000 on previous drafts of this paper, 
and research funding from the Australian Research Council Small Grants Scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Stock markets require listed companies to keep investors informed of changes that will lead to a 
material alteration in the operating conditions of the firm.  In the USA listed companies must 
disclose information on any change to the firm “that may affect security values or influence 
investment decisions, and in which shareholders, the public and the Exchange have a warrantable 
interest”. 1  Regulation FD has enhanced these rules by requiring an issuer making an intentional 
disclosure to make that information simultaneously available to the general public as well as 
“certain enumerated persons” such as industry insiders or stock holders (SEC 2000, Rule 100).  
Under the New York Stock Exchange Listing Rules and Regulation FD the disclosure process is 
undertaken through immediate press release. In Australia similar disclosure requirements exist and 
the announcement process has been codified in the listing rules of the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and sections of the Corporations Law.  Listed companies lodge announcements with the 
ASX if and when material changes take place, and the ASX date-stamps the announcement and, if 
deemed necessary, calls a halt to trading to allow the market to assess the value of the 
announcement.  In September 1999 the ASX in conjunction with the private sector firm Corporate 
File established an additional information provision service to the market that involved a voluntary 
post-announcement briefing from the firm on the subject of any material announcement. The unique 
feature of the “open briefing” is that it is an information additive process whereby Corporate File 
interviews the company on the earlier announcement and releases the briefing to the market as a 
whole and at the same time via the ASX . The aim of the open briefing is “to explain results and 
                                                           
1 See New York Stock Exchange (1999), Section 2 Disclosure and Reporting Material Information, para. 201.00.  The 
process of information release is described in para. 202.06. 
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announcements and to clarify any issue of concern to the market” and to “make that one explanation 
available to the wider market and at the one time” (ASX 1999a, p. 1). 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the characteristics of firms making open briefings 
and to investigate whether open briefings contain incremental information as measured by market 
reaction to the voluntary information releases. The open briefing process provides a unique 
experiment through which we can assess whether the additional release of information aids market 
participants in assessing the future cash flows of the firm. The use of the ASX announcement 
system to disseminate widely the open briefing avoids the selective disclosure problems Regulation 
FD is designed to eliminate. Evidence from the open market briefing process in Australia may 
therefore inform debate about the impact on disclosure practices of the new US regulations. 
There is a large capital markets literature on the characteristics of firms making voluntary 
disclosures, and more recently on incremental voluntary disclosures such as CEO presentations and 
conference calls following mandatory disclosures (eg. Francis, Hanna and Philbrick 1997, Frankel, 
Johnson and Skinner 1999).  We expect open briefing firms to exhibit similar characteristics to 
firms undertaking other forms of information disclosure - be larger and more profitable than 
industry peers, to have more growth opportunities and to be more regular visitors to capital markets.  
In order to investigate this proposition we compare open briefing firms to median industry control 
portfolios and estimate a model explaining the probability of a firm undertaking an open briefing.  
We then examine three metrics of information content of the open briefing - abnormal trading 
volume, abnormal volatility and abnormal share price behaviour around the material announcement 
and open briefing.  Finally we explain the cross-sectional variation of these abnormal returns with 
respect to firm specific characteristics (such as size, financial condition and performance, and 
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growth opportunities) conditioning on announcement characteristics (such as whether the initial 
material announcement was good or bad news).  
The paper contains five sections.  In section two we examine the announcement and 
mandatory disclosure process in Australia, and the role of open briefings.  In section three we 
investigate what types of firms make voluntary open briefings.  In section four we outline a model 
of information value and examine the market reaction to the open briefing.  Some concluding 
remarks follow. 
 
2. Firm announcements and mandatory disclosure 
 
Publicly listed companies are required to provide information to the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) and the ASX as outlined by the Corporations Law and the ASX 
Listing Rules.2  The principles behind mandatory disclosure are found in common law and 
legislation.  Corporations face obligations to disclose in common law in that directors are obliged to 
shareholders to protect and promote a fair and reliable market (Ford et. al. 1997, p. 416).  One of 
the rules associated with listing on the ASX (Listing Rule 3.1) is that corporations continuously 
disclose ensuring that “the market is fully informed at all times so investors can make informed 
investment decisions” (ASX 1997, p. 4).  Corporations also face legal requirements to maintain 
proper accounting records, prepare financial statements, and have an external audit of their financial 
system and accounts.  Under Australian Corporations Law the mandatory disclosure requirements 
relating to accounting and financial information include financial statements and reports before an 
Annual General Meeting; annual and half-yearly financial statements; and annual returns containing 
                                                           
2 On the enhanced statutory disclosure system and the impact of the system on disclosure policies of firms and market 
efficiency see Brown et. al. (1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1999). 
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information on a company’s registered office and principal place of business, issued shares, options 
granted, identity of directors, secretary members and ultimate holding company.3  In addition, 
section 1001A provides legislative reinforcement for the ASX Listing Rules such that corporations 
are required to continuously disclose information deemed to have a material effect on the price or 
value of the firm’s securities (Ford et. al. 1997, pp. 416-18).4 
 
2.1 Continuous disclosure of material information 
 
ASX Listing Rule 3.1 states that publicly listed companies must immediately disclose information 
to the market if that information would, on the expectation of a reasonable person, be expected to 
have a material effect on the price or value of the firm’s securities.  Market materiality is outlined in 
the Corporations Law section 1001D in the following terms: the information is deemed material “if 
the information would…influence persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether 
or not to subscribe for, or buy or sell, the … securities” (see Ford et. al. 1997, p. 443; ASX 1996, 
para. 8).  In addition, a firm may be required to make an announcement to the market if there is 
sufficient market speculation about an event such that a reasonable person would expect the 
company to confirm or correct the speculation (Ford et. al. 1997, p. 442; ASX 1996 paras. 10, 30, 
31). Rule 3.1 imposes an obligation on the listed entity to continuously disclose material 
information or correct market speculation about a firm specific event, subject to exceptions such as 
whether a reasonable person would not expect the information to be disclosed, the information is 
                                                           
3 For a list of similar topics covered by Regulation FD see SEC (2000, section B.2. Disclosures of Material Nonpublic 
Information). 
4 Brown, Taylor and Walters (1999, p. 161) show that to date “there is not…strong evidence of statutory civil and 
criminal sanctions having a marked effect on corporate disclosure policies”. 
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confidential, it would be a breach of a law to disclose the information, the information concerns an 
incomplete proposal or negotiation or it is a trade secret (ASX 1996, para. 4). 
The process of announcement involves companies lodging the announcement by hand, post 
or facsimile at the ASX Company Announcements Office, and be sure that it has not issued 
information for release to any other party before notifying the ASX.  Price sensitive announcements 
are then summarised by the ASX, and announced over the national public address system Voiceline.  
At the information release trading is halted (although bid and offers can be removed or added) 
giving the market time to react to the announcement. 
 
2.2 Voluntary disclosure through open briefings 
 
The open briefing was established in September 1999 to provide all market participants with access 
to a voluntary company briefing on the mandatory announcement lodged with the ASX.5  The 
purpose of the open briefing is to improve information flows between the company and market 
participants in order to reduce the risk of selective disclosure and improve market understanding of 
firm specific material changes.  As the ASX notes the open briefing is designed to “to allow the 
company to respond to the market’s reaction to the announcement and to the questions raised by 
that announcement” (2000, p. 1).  Like material announcements, open briefings can be released for 
two reasons:6 
(i) following a material announcement - giving the company the opportunity to respond to the 
market’s reaction; 
                                                           
5 We shall refer to mandatory announcements made under continuous disclosure rules and that have a material effect on 
the company as material announcements. 
6 This paper focuses on the first type of open briefing and leaves the independent voluntary open briefing (in the sense 
that it does not follow a material announcement) to later research. 
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(ii) following market speculation - to provide clarification or restatement of facts to market 
participants at times of market rumours (ASX 1999b, p. 1; 2000, p. 1). 
The decision to hold an open briefing remains with the firm, and is similar to the decisions 
managers make in the USA with respect to conference calls or CEO presentations. Conference calls 
are large-scale telephone calls that involve management presentations and analysts’ questions.  
While these calls provide the opportunity for the firm to provide greater information to analysts on 
the material announcement (in the US case, earnings announcements are the most common topic ), 
there is concern that the information disclosed during the call (like an analysts’ briefing) is not 
widely available to the market (Frankel et. al. 1999, p. 134). Furthermore, in introducing Regulation 
FD the Securities and Exchange Commission (2000) identified the practice of selective disclosure 
as having potential to reduce investor confidence in the integrity of capital markets. Analysts 
briefings and CEO presentations involve either the firm on a road show providing investors with 
information on the strategies of the firm, or invitations from analysts for briefings.  For example, in 
the USA the New York Society of Securities Analysts invites firms several months in advance to 
present to its members. Given such a time lag between invitation and presentation, it is unlikely that 
presentations provide a timely medium to convey news (Francis et. al. 1997, p. 364). 
The Australian announcement and open briefing process is illustrated below in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Time line of the Australian announcement and open briefing process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
event window  t 
Voluntary 
open briefing 
t+k 
Material  
announcement 
t0 
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where t = {t0,…t+k} for k days. The open briefing is undertaken by Corporate File and is released to 
the market via Voiceline usually two or three days after the material announcement.  The use of the 
ASX announcement platform ensures that the transcript of the briefing “goes to no part of the 
market before it is released to the whole market” (ASX 1999a, p. 1) and that “all levels of the 
market, professional and private, local and offshore, have equal access to the briefing on its release” 
(Corporate File 2000, p. 1).  This differentiates the open briefing from both the conference call and 
the CEO presentations that are popular in the USA.  While the open briefing interview is conducted 
in similar fashion to the analysts’ briefings and conference calls, Corporate File acts as sole 
interviewer (see appendix 1). Unlike the analysts’ briefings (a) Corporate File has no investor 
clients and does not question the firm on behalf of a particular investor group (eg. institutional 
shareholders), and (b) the full, unedited transcript of the briefing is available to all participants by 
using the ASX’s market-wide information dissemination technology (Corporate File 2000, p. 1; 
1999, p. 2). Thus, the process avoids the potential problem in the USA of corporate management 
treating the briefing “as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favour with particular analysts 
or investors” (SEC 2000, section II.A.). The Australian open market briefing involves greater 
market access to the information of the briefing, and timely information to the market on the 
immediate issue of the material announcement. 
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3. What type of firms undertake open briefings? 
 
In this section we analyse the characteristics of firms that have undertaken open briefings during the 
first year.  The first open briefings were released on 15 September 1999 and we have collected all 
open briefings to the end September 2000 (appendix 2 gives sample details).  The open briefings 
have been separated into those open briefings (as indicated above) (i) that followed a material 
announcement (N=52), and (ii) that represented independent voluntary disclosures by the firm 
(N=10).  As stated above, the analyses in this paper is on the first type of open briefing that follows 
a material announcement. Times and dates of open briefings and the announcements relating to 
these open briefings were collected from the ASX announcement platform available on the ASX 
homepage.  The use of the announcement platform ensures that we are able to accurately identify 
the event days when the information becomes available to market participants, and thus we avoid 
the potential problem in announcement studies of uncertainty in the announcement date (Ball and 
Torous 1988).  The type of announcement was classified according to the announcement and open 
briefing text headline.  Firm specific details such as market capitalisation, share prices and the 
market index were collected from Datastream, and accounting variables from Huntley’s 
DatAnalysis and the Annual Report Collection. 
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics by number of firms and briefings (Panel A), topic 
of open briefing (Panel B), the distributions of the number of open briefings per firm, market 
capitalisation of each firm, and number of trading days between the announcement and briefing 
(Panel C), and monthly distribution of open briefings (Panel D). 
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Table 1 
about here 
 
The sample contains 52 open briefings from 25 firms. Sixty percent of firms have released more 
then one open briefing, with one firm (BRL Hardy) undertaking the process five times.  One 
potential problem associated with multiple open briefings per firm is that if they occur regularly the 
market may alter its assessment of the value of additional news.  In all our analysis we shall control 
for previous announcements.  Panel B indicates that the most common open briefing topic related to 
earnings (73.1%), followed by strategy related briefings such as acquisitions and divestitures 
(7.7%), capital expenditures (7.7%) and output forecasts (5.8%).  The distribution of topics 
indicates that, like in the USA, firms are more motivated to disclose voluntarily on earnings 
announcements than other types of announcements, perhaps to take the opportunity to add greater 
depth to the standard information required by listing rules.  In the first year firms on average made 
two open briefings each. The average number of days between announcement and open briefing 
was 3.19 days, comparing well with the ASX and Corporate File’s stated aims of providing open 
briefings within 2-3 business days (ASX 1999b, p. 1). The size of the open briefing company (as 
measured as the market capitalisation of the company six trading days before the first 
announcement) averaged $707.86million; Wesfarmers was the largest company at $3398.85million 
(in February 2000) and New Hampton Goldfields was the smallest at $49.17million (in July 2000).  
Finally, there is some seasonality in the distribution of open briefings with 44% of the sample 
occurring in August and September 2000.  This is due to (a) the beginning of the major end-of-year 
reporting period for firms, and (b) the slow start to the open briefing process in 1999.  It is too early 
to assume that this seasonality will be a problem as the open briefing process matures. 
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The voluntary disclosure literature provides a good basis from which we can hypothesise 
about the type of firms that will undertake voluntary open briefings.  The seminal work of 
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) on costless disclosure indicated that firms will voluntarily 
disclose all information.  However, costly disclosure (Verrecchia 1983) and signalling models 
(Teoh and Hwang 1991) indicate managers must make cost-benefit choices in deciding upon 
disclosure levels and that it may be optimal for good news firms not to disclose all information.  
The empirical evidence on voluntary disclosure shows that there are conflicting incentives 
determining disclosure - firms can reduce the cost of capital be increasing revelation of forward 
looking information (Botosan 1997) but in doing so may reveal strategic information to 
competitors. Voluntary disclosure firms tend to be larger and more profitable than industry peers 
(Lev and Penman 1990, Lang and Lundholm 1993), grow more rapidly and have higher market-to-
book ratios than other firms (Frankel et. al. 1999). Firm and industry characteristics therefore need 
to be taken into account when analysing disclosures trends (Brown et. al. 1999). 
 In order to analyse the characteristics of open briefing firms each firm was matched to the 
median firm in an industry control portfolio.  The control portfolio consisted of a minimum of five 
randomly selected firms listed on the ASX and located in the same ASX two-digit industry 
classification.7 Due to the lack of end-of-year financial information for one newly listed firm, the 
sample of open briefing firms described in the previous section was reduced to 51 firms.  All data 
was collected from the same sources and by the same criteria as for the open briefing firms. 
 Table 2 shows financial characteristics of open briefing firms, and the mean and median 
differences between the open briefing firm and the median industry control firm.  Consistent with 
Lang and Lundholm (1993), Francis et. al. (1997), Frankel et. al. (1999) and Brown et. al. (1999) 
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we find that open briefing firms are larger and more profitable than their industry peers.  Open 
briefing firms are significantly larger as measured by median assets and sales, and have higher 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), and earnings per share (EPS) than non-open briefing firms 
(all variables are significant at the 1% level).  
 
Table 2 
about here 
 
In terms of discrete share price returns, open briefing firms perform worse than median control 
firms over one year although there is no significant difference between the firms over five years.  
Open briefing firms also have higher market-to-book ratios than the median control firm, lending 
further empirical support to the arguments of Frankel et. al. (1999, pp. 136, 141) that managers of 
higher growth firms experience greater information problems in a dynamic environment and are 
thus more likely to provide voluntarily the market with forward looking information (see also 
Francis et. al. 1997 p. 369).  Finally, open briefing firms have higher debt-equity ratios and higher 
net tangible assets consistent with several studies that show that voluntary disclosures are more 
likely from firms that have a closer relationship with capital markets (eg. Lang and Lundholm 
1993). 
 Probit analysis is then undertaken to identify which characteristics identified in Table 2 are 
associated with the decision to undertake an open briefing.  Two analyses are presented in Table 3.  
The first analysis (Panel A) involves a sample of 48 firms comprising 24 open briefing firms and 24 
median control firms - the 24 open briefing firms represent each firm’s first open briefing in order 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 There were three industries where a smaller number of firms comprised the control portfolio: Forest products and 
paper (N=2), Elecricity and gas (N=3), and Soft drinks and confectionary (N=4).  The average sized control portfolio 
  14 
 
 
to try to control for the possibility that the probability of a firm undertaking an open briefing 
depends upon whether they had previously released an open briefing.  The second probit estimation 
(Panel B) treats each open briefing observation as independent and matches each observation to the 
median control firm (N=102 comprising 51 open briefing firms and 51 median control firms).  
Estimation was undertaken to test various models relating the probability of an open briefing to firm 
characteristics such as size (natural log of total assets), growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), 
financial performance (EPS and EBIT; only EPS reported), risk (debt/equity ratio and interest 
expenses as a proportion of EBIT), and industry (resources or industrials).8 
 
Table 3 
about here 
 
Both estimations show that open briefing firms are more likely to be larger and have higher growth 
opportunities than non-open briefing firms.  Robust estimation shows that open briefing firms are 
also more likely to have higher debt/equity ratios than other firms.  Again these results are similar to 
those found by Frankel et. al. (1999, pp. 142-144) with respect to firms holding conference calls.  In 
the US case conference call firms were more likely to be larger, have higher market-to-book ratios, 
and have contemporaneous debt issuance.  The motivations for managers to issue open briefings 
after material announcements seem to be the same as those for managers to hold conference calls - 
their information environment is changing rapidly prompting voluntary information addition 
through the open briefing or conference call process.  In addition, these firms have an incentive to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
was 9.6 firms and the median size was 9.0 firms. 
8 The sample contained several firms with zero interest expenses.  Given the small sample size in the study interest 
coverage is defined here as interest expenses as a proportion of earnings before interest and tax in order to maintain 
degrees of freedom. 
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keep debt markets informed about the future financial position of the firm and are thus more likely 
to use additional disclosure to that mandated by the relevant stock exchange. 
Frankel et. al. (1999, p. 143-144) and Brown et. al. (1999, pp. 150-151) show that there are 
industry differences in the probability of voluntary disclosure.  In the US high tech and insurance 
firms were more likely to hold conference calls than other firms.  In Australia, firms in the mining 
industry are required by the ASX listing rules to disclose more often than industrial firms (eg. 
mining firms are required to file quarterly activity statements).  Thus, following Brown et. al. we 
have controlled for the industry of the open briefing and median control firm.  Only the larger 
sample probit reported in Panel B shows that resource firms are more likely to undertake open 
briefings than industrial firms (Brown et. al. 1999 also report a significant mining dummy variable).  
Given that resource firms are more likely to provide material announcements under the ASX 
continuous disclosure regime (and thus more opportunities for open briefings) this result is expected 
as the sample size rises. 
 
4. Investor reactions to open briefings 
 
This section analyses whether open briefings contain additional information content over and above 
that contained in the material announcement. This evidence is important in determining whether the 
open briefing process satisfies the ASX’s and Corporate File’s goals of providing accurate and 
timely briefings to “all levels of the market” on “a range of critical and time-sensitive subjects” 
(Corporate File 2000, p. 1). We investigate empirically the trading volume, volatility and share 
price behaviour around open briefings and the cross-sectional variation in open briefing abnormal 
returns. 
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4.1 Abnormal trading volume and volatility behaviour 
 
Previous research has examined both the trading volume and price volatility surrounding voluntary 
disclosures in order to identify whether those disclosures have information content.  The seminal 
work in this area is by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) who show theoretically that increases in 
trading volume indicate an increase in “informedness” as market participants’ demand for the stock 
becomes more extreme as traders become more knowledgeable.  Similarly, increases in volatility 
are associated with increased informedness due to price realisation being further from its 
expectation before the information release.  Thus, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990, p. 192) argue 
that “studies of unexpected price changes or volume are equally relevant means of assessing 
information ‘content’ assuming that information content is defined as the extent to which a 
information signal alters investors’ beliefs”. 
 Empirical analysis of trading volume and volatility around voluntary disclosures, conference 
calls and CEO presentations shows that such disclosures have information content.  In the 
Australian context, for example, Brown, Taylor and Walter (1996a, pp. 7-8) found that stock 
volatility (measured as the variance in end-of-month discrete returns) had decreased due to the 
introduction of the enhanced disclosure regime by the ASX in 1994.  Frankel et. al. (1999, pp. 146-
47) observe increases in volume and volatility in intra-day trading surrounding conference calls.  
Similarly, Francis et. al. (1997, p. 382) find increased trading volume around CEO presentation 
days. 
 In order to estimate the information content of open briefings we first estimate normal 
trading volume and volatility.  Using daily data we define expected volume (EVit) as the mean (and 
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median) volume traded per day for firm i over the previous 50 trading days, starting -60 trading 
days from the material announcement and finishing -10 trading days from that announcement.  
Abnormal trading volume (AV) is then defined as the ratio of actual (Vit) to expected trading volume 
(minus one) during the three day event window surrounding the material announcement and the 
open briefing (see Francis et. al. 1997, p. 382 for a similar estimation procedure): AVit = [Vit / EVit]-
1.  Expected volatility is measured as the absolute difference of the highest and lowest prices each 
day for the estimation period -60 trading days to -10 trading days (see Wiggins 1991 for arguments 
supporting this proxy for volatility).  Abnormal volatility (AVolait) for firm i over period t is the 
ratio of actual (Vola) to expected volatility (EVola) (minus one) during the relevant event windows: 
AVolait = [Vola it /EVolait]-1 
 Tables 4 and 5 present data on abnormal trading volume and volatility for the sample firms.  
Abnormal trading volume increases significantly around material announcements and open 
briefings when expected volume as measured as the median volume traded during the estimation 
period (Panel B Table 4).  Volume is 94% higher on the open briefing day and 88% higher on day 
+1.  By contrast, there are mixed results if we choose mean trading as the estimation of expected 
volume - volume is abnormally high the day following the material announcement but is not 
significantly different from normal on open briefing day 0 or day +1 (Panel A Table 4).  Abnormal 
volatility can also be observed, with median results showing volatility increasing around the open 
briefing by 40.6% (day 0) and 29.04% (day +1)(see Panel B Table 5).  Again the mean estimator of 
expected volatility yields significant results for the material announcement but not for the open 
briefing (see Panel A Table 5). 
 
Table 4 
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about here 
 
Table 5 
about here 
 
The fact that these results depend upon our measurement of expected trading behaviour is not 
surprising.  Mean estimators provide a less robust measurement of the normal trading behaviour 
given their susceptibility to extreme values.  Of course, the length of estimation period (50 days) 
could be lengthened to offset some of this problem although the cost of doing so is the increased 
likelihood that the estimation period would include more news events that would distort the 
estimation of expected behaviour.  Thus, we have adopted a shorter estimation period and use both 
median and mean estimators.  Overall, the median results indicate that open briefings are 
information laden and provide information to market participants over and above that in the 
material announcement. 
 
4.3 Abnormal share price behaviour 
 
In order to examine the share price reaction to material announcements and open briefings we have 
calculated daily abnormal returns to the announcing firm for an event window of five days before 
the day of the announcement to one day after the open briefing.  Given that there is no uniformity in 
the timing of the open briefing we have a variable size event window determined by k+1 days after 
the announcement (the event window is of size [-5, +(k+1)] where day k+1 is the day after the open 
briefing).  However, in reporting results we focus on a three day event window [-1, +1] for both the 
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announcement and open briefing.  Expected returns for individual stocks are calculated using the 
market model as: mtiSWiit RER ba += , where itER  is the expected return for company i in period t, 
Rmt is the return on the market in period t, ia and ßiSW = (ßi
-1+ßi
0+ßi
+1 )(1+21?m)
-1 are ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression coefficients calculated using a pre-announcement estimation period (ßi-n 
are obtained from an OLS regressions on lagged (n=-1), contemporaneous (n=0) and lead (n=+1) 
market returns, and 1?m is the first order serial correlation of market returns).  The estimation period 
spanned 250 days to 10 days before the material announcement. Thin trading is a common 
occurrence in the Australian market, and was a feature of our sample. Thus, we follow Scholes and 
Williams (1977) in adopting a firm beta to allow for thin trading of stocks (see ßiSW above).  
Abnormal returns (ARs) are defined as the difference between the realised return and the expected 
return, ARit = Rit – ERit, where ARit is the abnormal return for company i in period t, Rit is the actual 
return for company i in period t, and ERit is the expected return for company i in period t. 
Table 6 reports tests for significance for the market reaction to an open briefing by total 
sample and conditional on the good or bad news material announcement.  We find a significant 
market reaction to all announcements on the day of the announcement (only at the 10% level 
signed-rank test) but no significant results for all open briefings during the three day window (-1, 
+1)(see Panel A). 
 
Table 6 
about here 
 
Panels B and C show abnormal returns conditioned on whether the material announcement was 
good news (positive share price change) or bad news (negative share price change).  By design, the 
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day 0 returns are highly significant.  However, even when we condition on the type of material 
announcement there is no evidence that share prices react abnormally to the release of the open 
briefing (one caveat is the day -1 open briefing result for positive announcement open briefings in 
panel B). 
 
4.4 Multivariate analysis of open briefings 
 
In this section we examine the determinants of the cross sectional variation in market reaction to 
open briefings and the robustness of results estimated above in a multivariate framework.  The 
analysis undertaken in section 3 indicates that open briefing firms are larger, have greater growth 
opportunities and higher debt/equity ratios than median control firms.  We have also seen that there 
is some evidence that open briefings have information content, at least with respect to abnormal 
trading behaviour.  Model 1 (equation 1) relates the firm specific financial variables to the variation 
in abnormal return from the open briefing. 
 
OB = a + ß1(ANN) + ß2(SIGN) + ß3(SIZE) + ß4 (MB) + ß5(EPS) + ß6(COV) + e  (1) 
 
The open briefing abnormal return at day 0 is the dependent variable (OB). The material 
announcement day 0 abnormal return (ANN) and its sign (SIGN is denoted positive=1; negative=0) 
allow us to control for the size and sign of the material announcement.  SIZE is the natural log of 
market capitalisation of the firm six days before the material announcement and the financial 
variables MB, EPS and COV are as defined in section 3.9  We estimate various versions of this 
                                                           
9 We also estimated SIZE as the natural log of total assets (as in section 3).  None of these estimations for size were 
significant. 
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model to examine the extent to which investors focus on firm specific factors in reacting to the open 
briefing.10 Table 7 presents results.  Each model is statistically significant at the 1% level (see F-
stats).  The first two versions (Models 1 and 2) shows that size and interest coverage is significantly 
associated with the open briefing abnormal return, even when we control for the size and sign of the 
previous material announcement.  Consistent with previous voluntary disclosure literature, investors 
react more positively to larger firms’ open briefings.  In addition, given the way in which we have 
defined interest coverage (that is, COV is interest expenses as a proportion of EBIT), investors react 
more positively to firms that reveal additional information when those firms are more risky (that is, 
have less earnings coverage over interest) than other open briefing firms.11  This result may be due 
to the fact that the open briefing provides investors with the opportunity to receive higher quality 
(quantitative and qualitative) information on future strategies and financial outcomes as compared 
with the limited information contained in the material announcement.  Finally, firm performance 
and growth opportunities do not explain abnormal returns in either version. 
 
Table 7 
about here 
 
                                                           
10 There are significant correlations between OB and ANN (-0.25; 10% sig.), SIZE (0.37; 5% sig.), EPS (0.22; 10% sig.) 
and COV (0.49; 1% sig.)  We also note a significant positive correlation between SIZE and EPS (0.55; 1% sig.) and 
SIZE and COV (0.27; 5% sig.).  Thus in this sample larger firms are associated with higher earnings and higher levels of 
interest coverage: two features we have noted in section 3.  
11 Models including the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio in place of interest coverage were also estimated (not reported).  
Debt-to-equity ratios were not significant in models with or without COV.  In models with debt -to-equity replacing 
COV size increased in significance to the 1% level.  In models with debt-to-equity and COV (an insignificant 
correlation between the two variables of 0.045), COV remained significant at the 1% level and size significant at (at 
least) the 10% level. 
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Models 3 and 4 introduce dummy variables for MB, EPS and COV to isolate those firms that have 
growth opportunities, performance and interest coverage greater than the median control firm.12  
Frankel et. al. (1999) argue that growth firms are more likely to voluntarily disclose, and Francis et. 
al. (1997, pp. 386-88) find that abnormal returns are higher for firms that are more undervalued (as 
compared to industry peers) by the market.  We can extend these arguments to suggest that the 
reaction to information releases from firms with higher growth (higher performance, and are lower 
risk) than their industry control firm is greater than other open briefing firms. 
The results for Models 3 and 4 are also reported in Table 7, and show that Models 1 and 2 
are robust to whether the open briefing firms are better or worse than the median control firm.  Size 
and interest coverage remain important explanatory variables of the cross section variation in 
abnormal returns.  Again growth opportunities and performance are not significant explanators of 
the market reaction to the additional information from the open briefing.  Absolute and relative 
growth and performance are not related to the abnormal return to the open briefing firm. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The empirical evidence in this paper suggests that the open briefing process initiated by Corporate 
File and the Australian Stock Exchange adds to the timely provision of information to the market.  
The open briefings appear on average three trading days after the material announcement and 
provide all market participants with detailed, unedited briefings from the firm’s CEO. This process 
compares favourable with US voluntary disclosure practices such as conference calls which can be 
restricted to a subset of the market, and to invited CEO presentations which are rarely timely.  The 
                                                           
12 An alternative definition of the dummy variable as a continuous variable for firms which had MB, EPS and COV 
above the median control firm (zero otherwise) yielded identical results.  A resource dummy variable was also tried in 
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evidence as to whether open briefings have additional information content is mixed.  It is certainly 
the case that the briefings are information laden as measured by abnormal trading volume and 
volatility, although there is no strong evidence that share price reaction is different from zero.  
Indeed, caution is needed in interpreting these results given the relatively small sample size and first 
year of operation of the process. 
The strongest evidence provided by this analysis relates to the type of firm that undertakes 
an open briefing and the explanation of how the market reaction to open briefings varies by firm 
characteristics.  Firms undertaking an open briefing are larger, better performing, have greater 
growth opportunities and higher debt than their industry peers. These findings are consistent with 
previous studies on voluntary disclosure practices of Australian and US firms.  By modelling the 
probability of undertaking an open briefing we can see that firms that are larger, have greater 
growth prospects and higher debt are more likely to issue an open briefing.  The positive size effect 
is now well established in the disclosure literature (e.g. Lang and Lundholm 1993; Brown et. al. 
1999) and multivariate analysis showed that the size of the firm is positively associated with the 
size of the share price reaction to the open briefing.  The growth and debt findings deserve further 
comment.  Firms with higher market-to-book ratios tended to disclose voluntary to the market more 
often than other firms. This result lends support to the view that valuation and information gathering 
in growth markets is difficult for investors and that firms can improve communication with 
investors by undertaking open briefings (Frankel et. al. 1999). We also observed that firms that 
undertook open briefings tended to have greater debt/equity ratios than control firms. In the 
regression analysis, the information provided by open briefings was reacted to more positively if 
that briefing was by a firm that had lower interest coverage. This finding suggests that firms that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
all models but remained insignificant.  All sensitivity results are available on request. 
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have higher debt levels and lower interest coverage are rewarded by the market for increasing 
disclosure. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 52 open briefings undertaken by 25 firms between 
September 1999 and September 2000 inclusive. Open briefing and announcement details are obtained from the ASX 
announcement platform reported on the ASX homepage. The topic of open briefing is taken from the open briefing title 
as reported by Corporate File.  Number of trading days between announcement and briefing uses the ASX date-stamped 
days of the announcement and briefing (zero days indicates that the open briefing was the trading day after the material 
announcement). Market capitalisation data is from Datastream and market capitalisation is calculated 6 trading days 
before the announcement date. 
 
 
Panel A: Number of firms (number of open briefings) 
 
Number Number of firms Percent Number of open 
briefings  
Percent 
One open briefing 10 40.0  10 19.2 
Two open briefings 6 24.0  12 23.1 
Three open briefings 7 28.0  21 40.4 
Four open briefings 1 4.0 4 7.7 
Five open briefings 1 4.0 5 9.6 
Total  25 100.0 52 100.0 
      
 
Panel B: Topic of open briefing  
 
  Number Percent   
Earnings 38 73.1   
Acquisition/Divestiture/Joint venture 4 7.7   
Capital expenditure 4 7.7   
Output forecast 3 5.8   
CEO on strategy 1 1.9   
Financing (Buyback) 1 1.9   
Governance  1 1.9   
Total  52 100.0   
      
 
Panel C: Distribution of continuous variables 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Number of open 
briefing per firm 
2.08 2.0 1.12 5 1 
Market 
capitalisation 
($millions) 
707.86 319.20 817.76 3398.85 49.17 
Number of 
trading days 
3.19 2.50 2.69 14 0 
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Table 1 cont’d 
 
Panel D: Monthly distribution of open briefings September 1999 to September 2000 inclusive 
 
September 1999 October November December January 2000 February March 
4 1 0 2 0 6 7 
April May June July August September Total 
0 5 1 3 10 13 52 
       
 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of open briefing firms  
This table reports mean and median values for end-of-reporting year accounting variables and financial variables for the 
sample of open briefing firms.  Assets, sales, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), and net 
tangible assets (NTA) are as reported in the firm’s annual report before the open briefing. Earnings per share (EPS) is 
calculated as at the financial reporting year and is obtained from the firm’s annual report.  One and five year share price 
returns are discrete returns assuming a buy and hold strategy; not all firms in the sample had been publicly listed for one 
year and so these samples are 44 firms and 36 firms respectively.  Market-to-book ratio (MB) is calculated as the market 
capitalisation of the firm six days before the firm’s material announcement divided by the book value of total assets. 
Interest coverage (COV) is calculated as the ratio of the firm’s interest expenses to EBIT. Test statistics are reported 
using critical values from a normal distribution. Z-statistics are for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
     
Mean and Median Difference between the Open Briefing 
and the Median Control Firm 
 
Accounting Variable N Mean Median Mean 
Difference 
t-stat Median 
Difference 
Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
Assets ($m) 51 1693.16 650.67 -636.81 -1.06 231.53 2.96*** 
Sales ($m) 51 608.79 15.58 474.29 3.38*** 127.79 4.91*** 
EBIT ($m) 51 63.26 39.58 20.03 3.34*** 21.17 4.56*** 
EPS (cents) 51 25.06 19.98 12.66 4.15*** 12.27 3.87*** 
One year Return (%) 44 18.52 10.36 -15.50 -1.90* -7.98 -1.85* 
Five year Return (%)  36 14.04 12.43 1.58 0.98 4.38 1.25 
MB 51 1.11 0.85 0.32 2.03** 0.10 1.77* 
D/E 51 34.49 1.04 32.22 1.73* 0.19 3.32*** 
COV 51 0.34 0.25 -0.27 -0.78 0.07 1.25 
NTA 51 141.29 124.00 55.64 3.01*** 55.0  2.49** 
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Table 3 
Probit estimation of the decision to undertake an open briefing and firm characteristics 
Probit estimations are reported for two models of the probability of a firm undertaking an open briefing.  Panel A 
provides estimations from the first model using 24 open briefing firms (each firm’s first open briefing) and 24 industry-
matched median control firms.  Panel B provides estimations using all 51 open briefings and 51 industry-matched 
median control firms.  The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable coded one if the firm had an open briefing and 
zero otherwise.  Abbreviations are as follows: Ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of total assets as reported in the firm’s 
annual report before the open briefing.  Market-to-book ratio (MB) is calculated as the market capitalisation of the firm 
six days before the firm’s material announcement divided by the book value of total assets. Earnings per share (EPS), 
debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), and interest coverage (COV)(the ratio of the firm’s interest expenses to earnings before 
interest and tax) are calculated as at the firm’s end-of-year annual report date.  Resource is a dummy variable coded one 
if the firm was in the resources sector (ASX sector codes 1-5 and 12), zero otherwise. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: First open briefing (N=48) 
 
 Standard estimator Huber-White robust estimator 
Variable Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat 
     
Intercept -5.5553 -2.70*** -5.5553 -2.59*** 
Ln(TA) 0.3590 2.26** 0.3590 2.15** 
MB 0.8330 1.80* 0.8330 2.00** 
EPS 0.0073 0.46 0.0073 0.41 
D/E 0.0035 0.52 0.0035 2.45** 
COV -0.0880 -0.75 -0.0840 -1.39 
Resource 0.5243 1.08 0.5243 1.13 
     
McFadden R2 0.2237    
LR statistic 14.88    
Prob(LR stat) 0.0212    
     
 
Panel B: All open briefings (N=102) 
 
 Standard estimator Huber-White robust estimator 
Variable Coefficient Z-stat Coefficient Z-stat 
     
Intercept -6.6432 -4.04*** -6.6432 -3.81*** 
Ln(TA) 0.4165 3.31*** 0.4165 3.12*** 
MB 1.2346 3.25*** 1.2346 3.16*** 
EPS 0.0062 0.55 0.0062 0.50 
D/E 0.0041 0.94 0.0041 4.62*** 
COV -0.0880 -0.80 -0.0880 -1.29 
Resource 0.7093 2.00** 0.7093 2.07** 
     
McFadden R2 0.2663    
LR statistic 37.66    
Prob(LR stat) 0.0000    
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Table 4 
Tests for significance of abnormal trading volume surrounding material announcements 
and open briefings 
 
Abnormal trading volume (AV) is calculated as the ratio of actual volume (V) to expected volume (EV) minus one: AVit 
= [Vit / EVit]-1.  Panel A reports daily average abnormal trading volume (AAV) and test statistics for the total sample 
(N=52) of open briefings with expected trading volume calculated using the mean trading volume of the estimation 
period (days –60 to –10 before the material announcement).  Panel B reports daily average abnormal trading volume 
and test statistics with expected trading volume calculated using the median trading volume of the estimation period 
(days –60 to –10 before the material announcement).  Test statistics are reported using critical values from a normal 
distribution. Z-statistics are for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Abnormal trading volume (EV=mean) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAV t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAV t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 -0.1817 -1.40 -3.20***  0.9396 1.98* 1.08 
0 0.3129 1.61 0.09  0.1595 1.09 -0.15 
+1 0.8663 2.21** 1.53  0.0674 0.60 -0.42 
        
 
Panel B: Abnormal trading volume (EV=median) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAV t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAV t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 0.3553 1.54 -0.35  2.7728 2.08** 3.85** 
0 1.1463 3.42*** 2.18**  0.9494 3.38*** 2.35** 
+1 2.0948 3.28*** 4.09***  0.8829 3.46*** 2.82*** 
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Table 5 
Tests for significance of abnormal share price volatility surrounding material announcements 
and open briefings 
 
Abnormal volatility (AVola) is calculated as the ratio of actual (Vola) and expected volatility (EVola) minus one where 
volatility is measured as the absolute value of the daily highest minus lowest share price: AVolait = [Volait /EVolait]-1. 
Panel A reports daily average abnormal share price volatility (AAVola) and test statistics for the t otal sample (N=52) of 
open briefings with expected volatility calculated using the mean volatility of the estimation period (days –60 to –10 
before the material announcement).  Panel B reports daily average abnormal volatility and test statistics with expected 
trading volume calculated using the median volatility of the estimation period (days –60 to –10 before the material 
announcement).  Test statistics are reported using critical values from a normal distribution. Z-statistics are for the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Abnormal volatility (EVola=mean) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAVola t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAVola t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 -0.0557 -0.63 -1.17  0.1944 1.87* 0.69 
0 0.2566 1.75* 0.41  0.1255 1.17 0.13 
+1 0.2701 2.07** 1.28  0.0597 0.62 0.03 
        
 
Panel B: Abnormal volatility (EVola=median) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAVola t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAVola t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 0.1219 1.14 0.56  0.3510 2.74*** 1.71* 
0 0.5612 2.85*** 1.78*  0.4066 2.68** 1.92* 
+1 0.5623 2.88*** 2.41**  0.2904 2.43** 1.53 
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Table 6 
Tests for significance of the share price reaction to material announcements 
and open briefings 
 
Panel A reports daily average abnormal returns (AAR) and test statistics for the total sample of open briefings (average 
abnormal returns are provided for day -1, 0 and +1).  Panels B and C report daily average abnormal returns and test 
statistics for sub-samples conditional on the sign of the material announcement.  Abnormal returns are calculated using 
the market model with Scholes and Williams (1977) adjusted betas, using mtiSWiitit RRAR ba --= .  Test statistics 
are reported using critical values from a normal and Studentized t-distribution with (n-1) degrees of freedom where 
appropriate. Z-statistics are for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Total sample (N=52) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 -0.0062 -1.74 -1.85*  0.0007 0.17 0.49 
0 0.0049 1.01 1.68*  -0.0027 -0.78 -0.01 
+1 0.0050 0.44 0.68  -0.0023 -0.62 -0.73 
        
 
Panel B: Positive sub-sample (N=32) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 -0.0019 -3.22** -2.87**  0.0060 1.48 1.88** 
0 0.0237 5.77*** 4.93***  -0.0070 -1.58 -0.89 
+1 0.0043 0.96 1.43  -0.0009 -0.26 -0.70 
        
 
Panel C: Negative sub-sample (N=20) 
 
 
Event day 
 
Material announcement 
  
Open briefing 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
 AAR t-stat Wilcoxon z-
stat 
        
-1 -0.0029 0.43 0.58  -0.0046 -0.63 -0.62 
0 -0.0251 -3.69*** -3.90***  -0.0025 -0.42 -0.39 
+1 -0.0028 -0.49 -0.54  0.0028 0.38 1.14 
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Table 7 
Multivariate models with the abnormal return to the open briefing as the dependent variable 
 
This table reports regression results for four models using the abnormal return to the open briefing (OB) at day 0 as the 
dependent variable (N=51). The regressions are based on the following equation: OBi = a + ß1ANNi + ß2SIGNi 
+ß3SIZEi+ ß4MBi + ß5EPSi + ß6COVi + ei (and combinations thereof).  White’s tests indicate the F-statistic of rejecting 
the null hypothesis that the residuals are homogeneous.  The White’s F-statistics was significant in Model 1 and there 
we report White’s adjusted t -statistics.  Jacque -Bera statistics indicates the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are normally distributed.  None of the Jacque-Bera statistics were significant. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
         
Independent 
variables 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient White’s 
t-stat 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
         
Intercept -0.0348 -2.43** -0.0366 -2.58** -0.0518 -2.42** -0.0496 2.36** 
ANN -0.1326 -0.75     -0.1890 -1.34 
SIGN -0.0032 -0.35     0.0003 0.04 
SIZE 0.0052 1.86* 0.0048 1.80* 0.0064 1.73* 0.0067 1.83* 
MB 0.0018 0.78 0.0022 0.98 -0.0009 -0.25 -0.0010 -0.30 
EPS 0.0000 0.35 0.0000 0.51 -0.0000 -0.36 -0.0000 -0.41 
COV 0.0045 4.60*** 0.0046 4.33*** 0.0045 3.27*** 0.0043 3.12*** 
MBD     0.0078 0.97 0.0087 1.09 
EPSD     0.0103 1.07 0.0084 0.89 
COVD     0.0033 0.40 -0.0016 -0.18 
         
Adjusted R2 0.2764  0.2555  0.2440  0.2703  
F-stat 4.18***  5.29***  3.31***  3.06***  
         
White’s F-stat 1.80*  1.22  0.90  0.98  
Jacque-Bera 1.00  2.47  2.78  2.85  
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Appendix One 
Example text of an announcement and open briefing 
This text is copied verbatim from the Corporate File homepage (http://www.corporatefile.com/) and has been selected at 
random from the sample of open briefings analysed in this paper.  The summary announcement was made by the 
Adelaide Bank on 21 January 2000, and the open briefing was released to the market place on 3 February 2000. The 
briefing interview takes placed between Corporate File, CEO Barry Fitzpatrick and CFO John Patton. 
 
Summary Announcement. December 1999 Half Year Profit. 
  
Adelaide Bank posted a pre-tax profit of $19.579 million - down 10 per cent from the $21.795 million recorded in the 
first half of 1998/99.  The lower result was impacted by a reduction in the margin from 2.46 per cent for the six months 
to December 31, 1998 to 2.02 per cent for the six months to the end of December, 1999, arising from competitive 
pressures and the movement in market rates over the period. In addition, the prior year's result included a windfall gain 
of $1.2 million from the sale of Data Advantage shares. Income tax expense for the six months to December 31, 1999 
included an abnormal tax adjustment of $2.1 million to restate net future income tax benefits, as required by the Urgent 
Issues Group of the Australian Accounting Review Board. This adjustment was brought about as a result of the Federal 
Government's recent announcement reducing the corporate tax rate from 36 per cent to 30 per cent. This resulted in 
profit after tax and the abnormal tax adjustment being reduced from $14.38 million to $10.69 million, a reduction of 26 
per cent. The reduced profit levels were recorded despite significant growth in lending activity compared with the first 
half of 1998/99, further highlighting the impact of the pressure on margins.  
Other highlights included:  
· Steady interim dividend of 13 cents fully franked.  
· Re-introduction of the dividend re-investment plan.  
· A 3% rise in net tangible assets to $2.95 per share.  
· 71% lending growth.  
· 34% rise in total assets under management.  
· Capital adequacy ration of 11.13% with Tier 1 capital of 6.16%.  
 
© Copyright [2000], Corporate File Pty Ltd. All rights reserved  
Open Briefing. Adelaide Bank. CEO on profit fall and outlook. 
Record of interview :  
 
Corporate File 
In your recently released December half year result, you announced a 71 percent increase in lending and a 34 percent 
rise in assets under management but a 10 percent fall in pre-tax profit to $19.6m. Are you reviewing your loan growth 
approach?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
In recent years, we have been very successful in growing our loan book especially in interstate markets. Loan growth 
has been driven by discounted variable or 'honeymoon' rate loans. Given the change in interest rate markets, I think it’s 
fair to say that, in the recent period, we lent too much in the 'honeymoon' rate area.  
 
Corporate File 
Specifically, how much you have lent in the 'honeymoon' rate area?  
 
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Approximately 40 percent of our loan growth volume in the latest period. We have decided to significantly reduce 
lending via 'honeymoon' rate loans so that profit can flow through from our significantly enlarged loan book.  
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Corporate File 
What time is required for profits to flow through from 'honeymoon' rate loans?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
These loans are marginal contributors in Year One but they quickly jump to a strong return on equity of 16 percent in 
Years Two, Three and Four.  
 
Corporate File 
What lending growth rate do you now expect given your intention to wind back 'honeymoon' rate lending growth?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Our loan growth should contract dramatically in the second half. We would be happy with full year growth of 25 
percent in the asset book.  
 
Corporate File 
A reduction in net interest margin to 2.02 percent from 2.46 percent last December hurt profitability. What can you do 
to stabilise or improve margins in the current period?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Our recent strong loan growth has basically been funded through the 90 day bill rate. The margin squeeze has been 
caused by gyrations in bill rates as they have trended higher. But some relief has now arrived with the Reserve Bank 
increasing official cash rates by 50 points. This will allow Adelaide Bank to lift lending rates and improve our margins 
as the bill rate market had largely anticipated the Reserve Bank’s move.  
 
CFO John Patton 
We will also be passing on any future market rate movements to our origination network.  
 
Corporate File 
To what extent are you dependent on wholesale funding - more specifically, what percentage of your total funding 
comes from that area?  
 
CFO John Patton 
35 percent and it is capped at that level. But we are trying to reduce that level of funding via growth in retail deposits 
and especially our cash management trust.  
 
Corporate File 
What growth are you targeting for the retail deposit base?  
 
CFO John Patton  
We intend to raise one billion dollars in retail deposits this year. That target is heavily reliant on our alliances with 
intermediaries and with offerings such as the Credit Suisse cash management trust. Right now it is proving successful 
and a number of other alliances are in the pipeline.  
 
Corporate File 
Do you have a target for net interest margins in the June half year?  
 
CFO John Patton  
We have drawn a line in the sand at 2 percent. That’s where we are now. We intend to move our net interest margin 
above that level in the next 6 months.  
 
 
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
I would like to restore margins to more acceptable levels such as the 2.2 to 2.3 percent range.  
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Corporate File 
The fall in margins drove the cost to income ratio up to 67.1 percent versus 62.45 percent last December. That doesn’t 
seem acceptable. Where to now?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Costs in absolute terms are under control growing by 3.8 percent year on year. We would expect the full year costs to 
increase by a low 3 percent. With the restoration of net interest margins, we anticipate a cost to income ratio of close to 
60 percent.  
 
Corporate File 
Is 60 percent your medium or longer term target?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Our longer term target is 55 percent. We expect a cost to income ratio of close to 60 percent by June.  
 
Corporate File 
Another significant component in the profit fall was a 77 percent rise to $10.97m in fees paid to intermediaries for 
originating loans. Obviously, if you wind the lending back, that cost will stabilise. What else can you do to control or 
reduce the payments to intermediaries in the medium term?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
There are a number of initiatives. We are reviewing origination fees, looking at what business our originators do versus 
what business we  do and working out what is the most efficient way going forward.  
 
Corporate File 
Asset quality has improved over the latest half with gross non-accruals at just .08 percent of the total loan portfolio. Is 
the asset quality that good?  
 
CFO John Patton 
Our arrears are at historic lows and that applies to business lending as well as retail lending. Non-accrual loans in 
business lending total only nine accounts which is very manageable.  
 
Corporate File 
Specific provision for doubtful debts in the first half was $321,000. What level do you anticipate in future periods?  
 
CFO John Patton 
The recent provision was unusually low reflecting the quality of the loan book. In the second six months, it will be 
closer to $1.5m. A normalised level annually would be in the order of $3m.  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
79 percent of our assets are in housing and most of the housing book is mortgage insured. Our asset quality is 
impeccable.  
 
Corporate File 
You mentioned operating expenses are under control having risen 3.8 percent  in the half year. Have you further 
initiatives which will continue to contain expenses?  
 
CFO John Patton 
We have spent $3m in the implementation of Workflow and Document Imaging technology which has reduced the 
overall costs of processing a mortgage from $225 this time last year down to $150. We intend to move that down to 
$100 over the course of the next 2-3 years. Over and above that, we are also looking at reducing the cost of our branch 
network by a shared distribution arrangement with Mutual Community (a subsidiary of AXA) in South Australia where 
our branches overlap. And productivity improvements right across the bank are always under consideration.  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
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54 percent of all our costs are staff related. We have kept staff numbers under control. Total staff are down 8 to 774 
versus December last year. Productivity enhancements are coming through. Also, we have recently concluded an 
enterprise bargaining agreement. Wage increases will be limited to 2.5 percent per annum over the next 3 years together 
with incentives based on Adelaide Bank’s profit which will be paid to employees in shares.  
 
Corporate File 
On February 1, you completed the $47m Leveraged Equities acquisition. Are you still forecasting an $8m pre-tax, pre-
goodwill contribution from Leveraged Equities in its first full year?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Yes, we maintain the forecast. Leveraged Equities is a strategic acquisition for Adelaide Bank. It is earnings positive 
from day one.  
 
Corporate File 
Will the contribution be positive in earnings per share given the recent placement of 7.5m shares at $4.55 raising $34m?  
 
CFO John Patton  
Yes, positive in EPS terms despite the placement. Furthermore, the acquisition will not impact on capital usage as the 
continuing strategy is to securitise Leveraged Equities' margin lending book through Westpac's Waratah programme. 
The placement effectively funds the $25m goodwill component in the acquisition.  
 
Corporate File 
Following the share placement, what level of Tier 1 capital will you have?  
 
CFO John Patton  
Tier 1 capital was negatively impacted by the $25m goodwill item on acquisition but that is more than offset by the 
placement. To further improve our Tier 1 capital, we will reintroduce our dividend reinvestment plan. We are also 
looking at a securitisation program of up to one billion dollars over the course of the next 3-4 months and that will free 
up to $50m worth of capital. We would like to take Tier 1 capital above 7 percent by May to June this year.  
 
Corporate File 
So your short term strategy is a combination of securitisation, the DRP and the recent share placement which will push 
Tier 1 capital back over 7 percent by year end?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
That’s right.  
 
Corporate File 
What is the status of the Standard and Poors credit rating review?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
We met with Standard and Poors recently and revealed our plans. They will evaluate those plans and make their 
judgement within the next 2-3 weeks in relation to the ratings outlook for Adelaide Bank. We found the meeting most 
constructive.  
 
Corporate File 
You are currently trading on an historic price earnings ratio of around 12 times and on a fully franked yield near 6 
percent. On this arithmetic, some have suggested you are vulnerable to a takeover bid. Are you concerned about that 
prospect and how would you respond?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Adelaide Bank’s share price is low when you consider our 6 percent yield. I am on record for saying that we take a 
philosophical view on the takeover speculation. It has been around Adelaide Bank as long as I can remember. But full 
value for Adelaide Bank would have to be extracted before a positive recommendation was made and the price required 
would be well above current levels.  
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Corporate File 
Finally, do you consider your 3 year plan to lift the bank’s return on equity to 16 percent an achievable target?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Yes. I am still committed to 16 percent return on equity by June 30, 2002 and I am still committed to delivering a full 
year profit to June 30, 2000 of $30m. The first half was $13m before an abnormal income tax adjustment of $2.1m. We 
have strategies in place to ensure we get to $30m for the full year.  
 
Corporate File 
What elements of your business will drive you to that longer term target of 16 percent return on equity?  
 
CEO Barry Fitzpatrick 
Adelaide Bank is implementing a three year strategic plan. We are in the process of improving our asset and product 
mix. We have significantly improved our geographic spread and are now far less reliant on South Australia. We have 
formed and continue to form key alliances which will increase retail deposits. We have made acquisitions which will be 
earnings positive and have invested in new systems and technologies which will drive productivity.  
Adelaide Bank has a unique strategy. Our aim of 16 percent return on equity remains valid. 
 
Corporate File 
Thankyou Barry and John. We look forward to the next Open Briefing with Adelaide Bank.  
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Appendix Two 
Sample details 
This table shows the names and industry codes of firms that have undertaken open briefings and are included in the 
sample analysed in this paper.  Company name, ASX code, and industry code and type are obtained from the ASX 
homepage.  The size of the industry-matched control portfolio is provided in brackets next to the industry code.  
Announcement and open briefing dates have been obtained and cross-checked from the ASX announcement platform 
and Corporate File. 
 
No. Company Name ASX Code Industry Code Industry type Date of 
Announcement 
Date of Open 
Briefing 
     (dd/m/yy) 
 
(dd/m/yy) 
1 Iluka Resources ILU 23 (7) Mineral sands 23-Aug-99 15-Sep-99 
2 BRL Hardy Ltd. BRL 82 (6) Vintner 2-Sep-99 15-Sep-99 
3 Henrry Walker Eltin HWE 61 (11) Building contractor 7-Sep-99 15-Sep-99 
4 Portman Mining  PMM 21 (9) Diversified mining 15-Sep-99 21-Sep-99 
5 Bank West BWA 161 (11) Banking 29-Sep-99 4-Oct-99 
6 Adelaide Bank ADB 161 (11) Banking 1-Dec-99 3-Dec-99 
7 BRL Hardy Ltd. BRL 82 (6) Vintner 3-Dec-99 9-Dec-99 
8 Adelaide Bank ADB 161 (11) Banking 27-Jan-00 3-Feb-00 
9 Henrry Walker Eltin HWE 61 (11) Building contractor 14-Feb-00 24-Feb-00 
10 Wesfarmers WES 231 (15) Diversified industrial 15-Feb-00 18-Feb-00 
11 Peter Lehmann Wines PLW 82 (6) Vintner 16-Feb-00 22-Feb-00 
12 Australian Stock Ex. ASX 195 (8) Misc financial services 23-Feb-00 29-Feb-00 
13 GUD Holdings GUD 221 (15) Misc industrials 23-Feb-00 28-Feb-00 
14 Ticor TOR 23 (7) Mineral sands 1-Mar-00 6-Mar-00 
15 BRL Hardy Ltd. BRL 82 (6) Vintner 2-Mar-00 6-Mar-00 
16 Portman Mining  PMM 21 (9) Diversified mining 2-Mar-00 9-Mar-00 
17 Delfin Ltd. DEL 62 (14) Property development 6-Mar-00 10-Mar-00 
18 Envestra ENV 52 (3) Electricity, gas  7-Mar-00 14-Mar-00 
19 Simeon Wines SWS 82 (6) Vintner 8-Mar-00 15-Mar-00 
20 Iluka Resources ILU 23 (7) Mineral sands 9-Mar-00 16-Mar-00 
21 Bank West BWA 161 (11) Banking 26-Apr-00 1-May-00 
22 Wesfarmers WES 231 (15) Diversified industrial 9-May-00 11-May-00 
23 Peter Lehmann Wines PLW 82 (6) Vintner 10-May-00 11-May-00 
24 Simeon Wines SWS 82 (6) Vintner 10-May-00 12-May-00 
25 BRL Hardy Ltd. BRL 82 (6) Vintner 12-May-00 18-May-00 
26 Wesfarmers WES 231 (15) Diversified industrial 23-May-00 7-Jun-00 
27 Ticor TOR 23 (7) Mineral sands 4-Jul-00 11-Jul-00 
28 Australian Magnesium ANM 22 (14) Base metals 14-Jul-00 19-Jul-00 
29 New Hampton 
Goldfields 
NHG 11 (16) Gold producer 18-Jul-00 21-Jul-00 
30 Ticor TOR 23 (7) Mineral sands 2-Aug-00 10-Aug-00 
31 Wesfarmers WES 231 (15) Diversified industrial 8-Aug-00 11-Aug-00 
32 Pacific Dunlop PDP 231 (15) Diversified industrial 10-Aug-00 14-Aug-00 
33 Hills Industries HIL 231 (15) Diversified industrial 14-Aug-00 16-Aug-00 
34 Great Southern 
Plantations 
GTP 123 (2) Forest products, paper 14-Aug-00 16-Aug-00 
35 Henry Walker Eltin HWE 61 (11) Building contractor 14-Aug-00 23-Aug-00 
36 Hills Industries HIL 231 (15) Diversified industrial 21-Aug-00 23-Aug-00 
37 Australian Stock Ex. ASX 195 (8) Misc financial services 23-Aug-00 29-Aug-00 
38 Iluka Resources ILU 23 (7) Mineral sands 25-Aug-00 29-Aug-00 
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39 Peter Lehmann Wines PLW 82 (6) Vintner 28-Aug-00 30-Aug-00 
40 Simeon Wines SWS 82 (6) Vintner 29-Aug-00 1-Sep-00 
41 Neverfail Springwater NEV 94 (4) Soft drinks, confec 29-Aug-00 11-Sep-00 
42 GUD Holdings GUD 221 (15) Misc industrials 30-Aug-00 1-Sep-00 
43 Adelaide Bank ADB 161 (11) Banking 31-Aug-00 1-Sep-00 
44 Roc Oil ROC 41 (14) Oil/gas producer 31-Aug-00 5-Sep-00 
45 Data Advantage DAD 195 (8) Misc financial services 1-Sep-00 6-Sep-00 
46 Envestra ENV 52 (3) Electricity, gas  4-Sep-00 11-Sep-00 
47 Novus Petroleum NVS 41 (14) Oil/gas producer 5-Sep-00 11-Sep-00 
48 Delfin Ltd. DEL 62 (14) Property development 6-Sep-00 13-Sep-00 
49 BRL Hardy Ltd. BRL 82 (6) Vintner 7-Sep-00 11-Sep-00 
50 Portman Mining  PMM 21 (9) Diversified mining 12-Sep-00 21-Sep-00 
51 Sigma SIG 211 (10) Pharmaceuticals 12-Sep-00 22-Sep-00 
52 Melbourne IT MLB 226 (not 
matched) 
Computer, office 
services 
14-Sep-00 15-Sep-00 
 
 
 
